A Note on the Neutral Assignment of
Federal Appellate Judges

CARL TOBIAS*

Neutral Assignment of Judges at the Court of Appeals (Neutral
Assignment) 1 substantially increases comprehension of the federal
intermediate appellate courts. The most striking aspect of the recent
article by Professor J. Robert Brown, Jr. and Ms. Allison Herren Lee is
the revelation of new information which strongly suggests that the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit did not randomly assign
members of the federal bench to three-judge panels which heard cases
involving desegregation and that this practice facilitated substantive
results which favored integration.2 The material's release may well
provoke controversy; however, Neutral Assignment is much more than a
period piece. Indeed, that article has considerable salience for contemporary
appellate procedure.
Professor Brown and Ms. Lee have conducted painstaking research to
compile an invaluable empirical data set of judicial assignment practices
which all of the appeals courts apply.3 That information yields instructive
insights on how the appellate courts and circuit judges can use ostensibly
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1. J. Robert Brown, Jr. & Allison Herren Lee, Neutral Assignment of Judges at
the Court ofAppeals, 78 TEx. L. REV. 1037 (2000).
2. See id. For earlier, albeit more limited, analysis of the assignments, see
Jonathan L. Entin, The Sign of "The Four": Judicial Assignment and the Rule ofLaw, 68
MISS. L.J. 369 (1998).
3. See J. Robert Brown, Jr., Circuit Practices: Appendix to the Neutral Assignment of
Judges at the U.S. Court ofAppeals (Jan. 1, 2000), at http://www.law.du.edu/jbrown/.
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neutral assignments to constitute panels in ways that will foster specific
substantive detenninations. The material, thus, affords Neutral Assignment a
decidedly modern ring. For example, federal court observers perennially
express concern that procedures be neutral and that process not be
employed to reach substance.4 Brown and Lee concomitantly confirm
several recent studies which have ascertained that a majority of members on
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit invoke the
rehearing en bane mechanism to reverse three-judge panel opinions which
the majority considers too liberal politically.5
An equally remarkable, albeit less provocative, phenomenon revealed
by the empirical data that Brown and Lee adduce is the enormous
variation in the local appellate procedures which govern practice in the
appeals courts. Neutral Assignment is replete with illustrations of the
substantial discrepancies that obtain among the appellate courts in the
sharply circumscribed corner of procedure which implicates panel
assignments. These encompass the significant differences that attend
responsibility for, and the timing of, panel assignments as well as the
dissemination of information about the composition of particular threejudge panels. 6
It is important to capitalize on the perception that procedural
disparities extend far beyond the narrow confines of panel assignments
proffered by Brown and Lee. In fact, the stunning disuniformity manifested
in this area is symptomatic of a considerably more ubiquitous phenomenon.
The discrepancies actually pervade every significant feature, and many
less critical dimensions, of contemporary appellate practice. Each of the
appeals courts has applied burgeoning numbers of local requirements
which conflict with or repeat the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure,
congressional legislation, or the local strictures in the remaining appeals
courts. Illustrative are the diverse local commands that cover such
fundamental matters as briefing, oral argument, and the citation to and
publication of opinions.7 The exponential proliferation of local measures,
4. See, e.g., ROBERT M. COVER & OWEN M. Flss, THE STRUCTURE OF PROCEDURE
ch. 2 (1979); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HARV. L. REV. 1, 9-10 (1959).
5. Compare Brown, Jr. & Lee, supra note 1, at 1111, with Tracey E. George, The
Dynamics and Determinants of the Decision to Grant En Banc Review, 74 WASH. L.
REV. 213, 273-74 (1999) and Phil Zarone, Agenda Setting in the Courts ofAppeals: The
Effect of Ideology on En Banc Rehearings, 2 J. APP. PRACTICE & PROCESS 157, 174
(2000). See generally Mark Hansen, Mid-Atlantic Drift, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1999, at 66, 67;
Neil A. Lewis, A Court Becomes a Model of Conservative Pursuits, N.Y. TIMES, May
24, 1999, at Al.
6. See generally Brown, Jr., supra note 3.
7. See The Honorable Boyce F. Martin, Jr., In Defense of Unpublished Opinions,
60 OHIO ST. L.J. 177, 193-97 (1999); Gregory C. Sisk, The Balkanization of Appellate
Justice: The Proliferation of Local Rules in the Federal Circuits, 68 U. COLO. L. REv. I,
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many of which are inconsistent or duplicative, threatens to fracture
additionally the already fragmented state of modern appellate practice,
increasing expense and delay and complicating efforts of litigants and
attorneys to participate in appeals before multiple appellate courts.8 The
developments reveal how profoundly prescient was Professor Charles
Alan Wright's trenchant characterization of the local rules as the "soft
underbelly" of federal procedure three and a half decades ago. 9
All of these ideas mean that the individuals and institutions which are
responsible for preserving and promoting uniform appeals court practice
and procedure must expeditiously and decisively implement actions that
will stop balkanization or at least ameliorate further fragmentation. For
instance, specific appellate courts could voluntarily canvass their own
local strictures and eliminate or modify measures which conflict with or
repeat the federal rules. Those appeals courts and the Judicial
Conference of the United States might correspondingly discharge certain
duties that the United States Supreme Court and the United States
Congress have expressly conferred upon the courts and the Judicial
Conference. The 1995 amendment to Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 47, 10 which governs local rules, and the Judicial
Improvements and Access to Justice Act of 1988 11 required the appellate
courts and the Judicial Conference to review and abrogate or change
local appeals court strictures that contravene or duplicate the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure or federal statutes. 12 The appeals courts
have expressly ignored the instructions of the High Court and lawmakers
7-24 (1997); Carl Tobias, Local Federal Civil Procedure for the Twenty-First Century,
77 NoTREDAMEL. REV. 533, 542-44, 569 (2002).
8. See Sisk, supra note 7, at 26-34; Tobias, supra note 7, at 556-58, 569. See
generally CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 62, at 431-32 (5th ed.
1994).
9. See Comment, The Local Rules of Civil Procedure in the Federal District
Courts-A Survey, 1966 DUKE L.J. 1011, 1012 n.6 (citing Letter from Charles Alan
Wright to the Duke Law Journal (Nov. 16, 1965)); see also Charles Alan Wright,
Foreword: The Malaise of Federal Rulemaking, 14 REV. LmG. 1, 10 (1994) (remarking
on the "phrase that has since been much quoted").
10. See FED. R. APP. P. 47 advisory committee's note (1995); FED. R. APP. P. 47,
514 U.S. 1141, 1142 (1995).
11. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 332(d)(4), 2071(c) (1994 & Supp. V 2000); see also H.R.
REP. No. 100-889, at 27 (1988). The 1995 federal rule revision "codified" the mandates
in the 1988 Judicial hnprovements Act and subjected local measures that repeat federal
rules or statutes to review and change. See sources cited supra note 10.
12. See sources cited supra notes 10--11; see also 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1994 & Supp. V
2000) (authorizing the Judicial Conference as the policy-making arm of the federal courts
and prescribing its duties).
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by prescribing even more local measures, many of which conflict with or
reiterate the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure or Acts of Congress.
The Judicial Conference, however, has never undertaken the rigorous
scrutiny of these mechanisms that the Supreme Court and legislators
envisioned. 13
Senators and representatives could also treat the proliferation of local
appeals court requirements by adopting the 1991 proposed rule
amendment which the federal rule revision entities withdrew in apparent
deference to contemporaneous experimentation using measures that
conserve cost and time implemented under the Civil Justice Reform Act
of 1990. 14 The recommended rule alteration would have authorized
courts that secured Judicial Conference approval to test, for not more
than five years, promising local procedures which contradicted or
repeated the federal provisions or congressional statutes. 15 This
approach would increase uniformity while fostering experimentation
with salutary techniques and empowering appeals courts to apply
efficacious mechanisms that address unusual local problems which the
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure frequently do not resolve. 16
Those persons and organizations that have responsibility for the
maintenance and promotion of consistent appeals court practice and
procedure should promptly institute the actions suggested. For example,
the appellate courts and the Judicial Conference ought to survey
13. See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text; see also Sisk, supra note 7, at 5152 (mentioning some Conference scrutiny). See generally Wright, supra note 9, at 10.
In fairness, Congress appropriated no resources for local procedural review by the courts
or the Conference. See Tobias, supra note 7, at 572.
14. See Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference
of the United States, Proposed Rules: Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 137 F.R.D. 53, 153
(1991) (proposing the 1991 amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83(b)). See
generally A. Leo Levin, Beyond Techniques of Case Management: The Challenge of the
Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 67 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 877, 891-92 (1993); Carl
Tobias, improving the 1988 and 1990 Judicial Improvements Acts, 46 STAN. L. REv.
1589, 1616 (1994).
15. See Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference
of the United States, supra note 14, at 153. See generally A. Leo Levin, Local Rules as
Experiments: A Study in the Division of Power, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1567, 1582-83
(1991); Laurens Walker, Perfecting Federal Civil Rules: A Proposal for Restricted Field
Experiments, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1988, at 67.
16. In fairness, the appellate courts might have applied inconsistent or repetitive
local measures to experiment, to address peculiar local difficulties, or to treat rising
dockets with scarce resources. However, the ideas recommended here would be
responsive to these needs and to the problem of local procedural proliferation. See
Robert E. Keeton, The Function of Local Rules and the Tension with Uniformity, 50 U.
Pm. L. REV. 853, 874-75 (1988). See generally Erwin Chemerinsky & Barry
Friedman, The Fragmentation of Federal Rules, 46 MERCER L. REv. 757, 783-91
(1995); Levin, supra note 14, at 888-94; Carl Tobias, Some Realism About Federal
Procedural Reform, 49 FLA. L. REV. 49, 68, 72-73 (1997).
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carefully local requirements and abolish or modify any strictures that they
deem conflict with or duplicate federal rules or statutes. Congress might
correspondingly allocate the requisite resources to facilitate the
expeditious performance of these assignments, while lawmakers could
amend Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 47 to authorize appeals
court experimentation with disuniform or repetitive measures that may
improve appellate practice or treat peculiar local complications. Those
activities should rectify local procedural proliferation or at least
moderate the additional fragmentation of federal appellate practice and
procedure which judicial assignments illustrate, phenomena that the
meticulous research of Professor Brown and Ms. Lee so clearly reveals. 17

17. They admonish the judiciary to implement random assignments, lest Congress
"mandate that circuits assign cases and judges in a neutral and objective manner based
upon principles of random selection ... [and] lock the courts into a mandatory system
specified by" legislation pending in Congress, an admonition that may similarly apply to
the proliferation of local appellate procedures. Brown, Jr. & Lee, supra note 1, at 1107;
see also S. 1484, 106th Cong. (1999). But see Levin, supra note 15, at 1585-87.
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